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William Ockhsun
and Trope Nominalism
Can we take a medieval metaphysician out of his scholastic
robes and force him into a metaphysical apparatus as seemingly
foreign to him as a tuxedo might be? I believe that the
terminological and conceptual differences that appear to prevent
this can be overcome in many cases, and that one case most
amenable to this project is the medieval problem of universals.
After all, the problem for the medieval is, at base, the same as it is
for contemporary philosophers, as for Plato: How do we account,
ontologically, for many tokens of the same type? If one object has
the property x and another, distinct object has the "same" property
x, how to explain the apparent "samenessw of the property x? Is x
one property or two? I will argue that William Ockharn's ontology,
when considered in light of some contemporary philosophical
thought, is remarkably fresh and vital, able seriously to be considered as a tenable position, so long as we are clear about what
Ockham is saying. This clarity is no easy task, since so much of what
Ockham said is rooted in an Aristotelian metaphysics most
philosophers have, rightly or wrongly, abandoned. Our discussion
will be an ontologically basic one; we will get clear on what Ockham
believes there is, and how he believes there can be many tokens of
the same type. A more detailed consideration of his logic of terms is
precluded by the elementary nature of the discussion.'
The discussion will be divided into two sections. First, I believe
it will be helpful to set forth two positions familiar to the contemporary philosopher. D.M. Armstrong has catalogued nominalism as
it is understood today in N0minaIi.m and ReaIimz, and in his more
recent UnivmaI.: An Opinionated Introduction3, and I will use these
as our anchor to contemporary thought. Concept Nominalism is a
species of nominalism that can easily be mistaken for the
'1 would like to thank Ruth Garrett hlillikan, A S. hlcGnde, and Andrew
Beedle for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
*D.M. Armstrong, Nainalim and Realinn: Univrnals and Scien$c RuJicm
Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. PPS, 1978).
3 ~ M.
.
Armstrong, Uniumals: An Opinionatrd Zntrodnm'a (Boulder GO:
Wesdew Press, 1989).
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Ockhamist position, given the importance of concepts in his
metaphysics, and so I will quickly outline the bare bones of this
position, sufficient to show later on that it is not Ockham's. I will
then discuss Armstrong's characterization of Trope Nominalism, a
position he pomays as relatively innovative in his 1989 work I think
that Ockham's ontological program is something very like this
Trope Nominalism, and in the second half of the discussion, I will
vgue this. That Ockham's position is innovative, not avowedly
realist, yet not radically nominalist in the contemporary sense, is
not news. Marilyn Adams recognizes this. "Since Ockham
identifies Universals primarily with naturally significant names or
concepts, it is perhaps less misleading to say that he was a
conceptualist rather than a nominalist about Universals."'' But the
tendency to identify "conceptualism" with Concept Nominalism,
and hence with what will prove to be an untenable position, is
dangerously tempting, and so first we must look at what is involved
in Concept Nominalism.

I
CONCEPT AND TROPE NOMINALISM

All nominalists agree that the only things there are, are
particular objects. Extramental Universals are for the realists. T h e
nominalist question is, "What is it that allows us to use universal
terms to describe these objects?" For the Concept Nominalist, i t
is only that a particular object fall under a concept, while for a
Tropist, as we will see later, more is involved.
"X has the property F if x falls under the concept of F" means
that (what makes) a certain object's (possession of the property)
"being white" (simply is determined by the fact that) the concept
'white' applies to the object. But if the concept 'white' did not
exist, would the object not still be white? If so, the object's
whiteness is constituted by something more than the object's
relation to the concept 'white', and we are dealing with something
more than Concept Nominalism. If there is something about the
particular that explains why the concept 'white' is applicable to it,
'1MariIp McCord Adaau, W . i &Lbm
Notre Dame Prm, 1987) 73.

(NO- Dame IN: University
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aside from or more than the brute fact that it does not apply, there
is ontologically more than the Concept Nominalist will admit to.
If the Concept Nominalist mes to slide around this by
explaining that particulars falling under the same concept do so
because of the resemblance which these particulars have to each
other; if, like Locke, they refer to the "similitudes of things,"s
then the resemblance must be taken as a real relation, and
something more ontologically rich than Concept Nominalism is
involved, namely, Resemblance Nominalism. If we are determined
to proceed along a Concept Nominalist line, keeping our ontology
as bare as it seems we must, Armstrong suggests, we will quickly
find the position to be untenable.
Take the class of white things. For the Concept Nominalist,
this class may have its unity because each of its members has the
"falling undern relation to the same concept, 'white'. That is, each
of the members of the class has a sameness of type; each white
thing has the same sort of relation to the concept 'white'. So the
Concept Nominalist seems to want to have types as being things in
the world, which is also inadmissible, for all there are that make
objects white are concepts, not types. T o claim that the type
'white' is the class, or type, of its tokens is to suggest Class
Nominalism, not Concept Nominalism.
And what of "falling-under"? If all objects are related to
concepts by the common relation-type "falling-under", we have a
relation-type being given more ontological weight than a Concept
Nominalist is able to admit, since there can be no relations save as
constituted by concepts. This, Armstrong believes, leads to an
object regress, from which no escape seems possible. A relation
regress is also inescapable.

Again, falling-under is a type of relation. Pairs of particulars and
concepts can only be considered tokens of this type if they fall
under the concept falling-under. But this new falling-under
again requires analysis?
Further, the world's causal order seems to depend on the properties
of the particular objects therein, and is mind-independent for all
----

'See John Lodre, An Essay C m m i n g Hwnan Understanding, IlI, Chpt. VI,
d.
6DM.Armstrong, Nominolin and Rcalh: Universals m d Srirn@ Realism, 27.
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save the Hurnean or the Idealist. "But, inconsistently, the Concept
Nominalist holds that the properties of things are determined by a
certain relation which things in the world have to objects in
minds."' This means that, for the Concept Nominalist, causality is
ultimately mind-dependent, thus forcing him either to admit to
Humean skepticism or defeat.
Armstrong characterizes Concept Nominalism as a subjectivist
solution to the problem of universals. Universality is located
entirely in the human mind, and man is effectively the measure of
all things. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume appear to have leaned towards
Concept Nominalism, in that they felt that their analysis of
concepts or "ideasn explained how it is and what it is for a particular
object to have a property or relation. As mentioned, Locke was
prone to slipping a "natural similitude of things" in along with the
particular objects that there are in the world, which would, strictly
speaking, make him more a Resemblance Nominalist. Armstrong
describes the Concept Nominalist position as untenable, if not for
its problems with causality, then certainly for its inescapable object
and relation regresses.
The Tropist position is much more plausible. Tropes are also
called "casesn or "concrete properties"; they are properties and
relations as particulars, or "particularized Universals." T o be a
Trope Realist, one would need to hold a set of Universals in which
the particularized Universals, or Tropes, participate, but this would
seem an unnecessary position-why postulate Tropes if espousing
realism? That is, why add particularized universals to an ontology
already rich enough to admit to non-particularized universal3 Trope
Nominalism is a much more interesting approach, for it allows us to
recognize not only pamcular objects, but also particular properties
and relations as ontologically available to the metaphysician, while
not committing ourselves to full-blown realism.
Armstrong suggests that we might view Tropes, particular
properties and relations, as organized into objects in either of two
possible ways. W e might follow Russell's lead and explain objects as
bundles of properties united by cornpresence, although we would
eschew Russell's bundle-of-universals account in favor of bundlesof-Tropes. Armstrong prefers another view, one more suited to the
'Op.at
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medieval approach. He describes a substance-attribute model of
explaining how Tropes are combined to make particular substances;
"...particulars have properties and stand in relations to other
particulars."* The particular objects are the substances that have
particular properties and (thereby) particular relations to other
particular objects. Is the underlying substrate in which all Tropes
inhere inimical to this view? There need not be some invisible
metaphysical core to every object in which properties mysteriously
inhere, although Armstrong seems to admit that this is a possibility
in his talk of "thin particularsn as the basis for substance-attribute
realism, and while we are dealing with Trope Nominalism I do not
think his argument has changed overmuch, but then I also doubt
that we are necessarily bound to admit the need for these "thin
particulars." What makes these particular properties and relation
parts of this particular object are what Armstrong calls states of
affairs, or facts.
Let us look at what states of affairs are from a Trope Nominalist
position. We have a particular property F, a particular object x in
which F could inhere, and we have an inherence relation, allowing
the possible inherence of F in x. But this does not give us Fx; what
is needed for Fx is that Fx is the case, that F inheres in x as a fact, a
state of affairs, -Fx, because it would be a fact that F does not
inhere in x. h s t r o n g explains that these states of affairs rest on a
"truth-maker principle." "According to this principle, for every
contingent truth at least (and perhaps for all truths contingent or
necessary,) there must be something in the world that makes it
true."9 In our case this something would be the fact that Fx or that
-Fx. So, while particular object x and particular property F could
exist without x being F (particular property F would have to be in
some other particular object, of course), x+F does not necessitate
x's being F; what makes it the case is that Fx is a f a n
States of affairs are not something ontologically more than their
constituents. "States of affairs flow necessarily from, supervene on,
the bare existence of their ~onstituents."~~
But is not
spatiotemporality an important factor to consider in determining
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facts? Particular property F might very well be "being in Location
L at Time T," in which case, all that would be needed for Fx is that
the state of affairs "that x is in L at T," obtain. Relations also
present no problem from this standpoint. Let us examine x's
particular relation xRy. Assume that for xRy to be the case, Fx and
Gy, in which F and G are Tropes, must also be the case. If state of
affairs "that x is Fn and state of affairs that "that y is G" both hold,
all other things being equal, it is certainly possible to recognize the
conjunct state of affairs, "Fx and Gym as obtaining. So we
automatically have met the criteria xRy from the state of affairs
being the case. This pamcular relation as formulated is about x and
its relatedness to y, and is something other than a relatedness that y
might have to x, unless the relation is a reflexive one, which has not
been a part of the description. Thus we can admit particular
relations, or relation-Tropes into the picture.ll Because of this, we
area able to escape the regresses that bedevil Concept Nominalism.
States of affairs have accounted for most particular relations, but
inherence needs more explanation, since it was taken as given in
observing how states of affairs operate. Inherence seems to be a
relation-type, and ought to be a third party in any state of affairs Fx.
But let us look at inherence as a higher-order relation that F must
itself have; if Tropes can themselves have Tropes, it would appear
that inherence will not present any major problem, given states of
affairs.
If we have F as a possible particular property and x as a possible
particular object, if state of affairs Fx obtains, it would seem that F
would itself have to have the relation of inherence to x. Armstrong
seems not to have any difficulties with this, so long as we are not
arguing from the way language worh to higher-order properties, " a
very a priori way of proceeding."u He suggests that a substanceattribute model of the relation of a first-order Trope to its own
particular property is plausible-if the state of affairs is such that F
has the inherence-relation when Fx obtains, all that is needed to
explain how this is so is an explanation of how Fx is so, which has
already been given. N o regress need arise, because states of affairs
have put the cap on any possibility of one. But in his discussion of
"See mid, 126.
at
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universals, Armstrong admits that instantiation is a primitive, and
cannot be explained; the same may be necessary for our description
of inherence, because inherence works in Trope Nominalism in
very much the same way instantiation works for a realist position.
It seems easy to envision a relation regress for inherence if
Tropes themselves can have higher-order Tropes, but Armstrong
insists that a state of affairs is something that is irrefutable, and so
staves off the specter of regress with the finality of fact. It appears
best to admit inherence to be a primitive, though, in case
epistemological questions arise concerning whether knowledge about
states of affairs is certain in every case.
This is a sufficient description of the essentials of the Trope
Nominalism position on which to map Ockharn's ontology. We
have a nominalist theory that admits of particular properties and
relations, that puts a heavy emphasis on a reliable recognition of
states of affairs, on the way things are in the world, and we have
inherence as a real, albeit primitive relation, admissible so long as
not merely necessitated by (artificed) linguistic structure.
I1
INTRODUCING TROPES T O OCKHAM
For Ockahm, all that there are in the world are particular
objects and particular qualities (relations will be discussed below.)
There are no Universal things, only singulars.
Everything outside the soul is really singular and numerically
one, for anydung outside the soul is either simple or composite. If
it is simple, it does not include many things...If it is composite, one
will finally have to arrive at a certain number of parts. Consequently
each of these parts will be numerically one."

" ~ i l l i u nOchhm, Ordinatio d.2, q.6, Paul V. Spade a l . , draft, 1986. [MI
references to Ockaham's Latin works arc to the editions of GuiUrImi & Ockbm,
Opera Tboebgka 107%) and Opera Pbilampbirrr at Tbeobgira [OFl%], G.
0-FM. et
al. eds. (St. Bonavennve NY: Franciscan Institute, 1966-1988) 07% I, 196.13-21
"...omnis res extra animam est rcalitcr singulvis et una numem, quia omnis rcs utn
animam vel en simplex vel composin....Si sit composiu, tandun o p o m devinere ad
certuxn numenun partiurn, et per consequeas quleliber illarum M u m erit uua
numero..

.."
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We cannot claim that there are particular properties, as
Armstrong does, because we are dealing with different terminology,
based on the Aristotelian categories. "A property, then, does not
inhere in the subject whose property it is said to be."'+ Properties
are intentions that connote something extrinsic to what is
designated by the subject; "it can be something which is by nature
predicable, or it can be a proposition existing or capable of existing
in the mind."ls Quite simply, a property is species of Universal, or
concept (the two are synonymous), by which we understand how
things, are in the world. And since there are particular qualities, a
property can connote in a concept what is really distinct from a
particular object (or substance) that is the subject of a concept.
We are bound by a different ontological terminology when
dealing with an Aristotelian metaphysics, but this should not be so
daunting. What Ockham describes as particular substances and
particular qualities roughly correspond to particular objects and
particular properties. But particular qualities must be further
explained; are there not eight other categories to be accounted for?
As Ockham sees it, all the other categories, quantity, relation,
action, and the rest, fall ontologically under theTcategbry quality.
The distinctions implicit in the categories are worth preserving for
Ockham, but the distinctions of the "other eightn, aside from
substance and quality, are not rooted in the kinds of things, but i n
the kinds of names of things.
I claim that substance, quality, and
quantity are distinct categories, although 'quantity' does not signify
any absolute things that are distinct from substance and quality.""

"...

14~rarmrrtLogicoe I, Chpt. 24, in Ockbmn's Tbemy of T m Part 1 of tbe S m m ~
Lagicae, Michael J . Lou, transl. (Nome Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press,
1974) 101; OPTb I, 79.40, "Non solum antern tmcndum st quod proprium non
semper at i n h a e r a subimo cuius dicitur proprium
'5~bid, 102; OPTb 1, 80.78-81.80 "Non tamen oportet q w d -per
Uud
urrinsecum sit aligau res extra animam, exsistens realiter in rerum nanm, sed forte
aliquvldo sufficit quod sit aliquid possibiie in renun nanua, vel forte digno propositio
mistens vel potens in mente exsistere."
L 6 ~ ~
N,rq. 27
t in William of Odcham, QwdltbrtrJ Qwm'ons, VoL I, Alfred
J. F d d o s o and Francis E. W e y (Yale Library of Medieval Philosophy: Yale Univ.
Press, 1991) 360. Orb LY, 436.6548 "...dimqnod substantia, qualitas, quantitas sunt
distinm pnedicamenta, qnamvis non significent rem absolutam distinctam a
s n h t i a , et qnalitate, quia sunt distincti conceptns et voca easdem res diversixnode
significantes."

..."
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But it is one thing to say that all that there are are particular
substances and their pamcular qualities; given the categories, we
must explain why the "other eightn fall ontologically under quality.
We can kill two birds with one stone if we address relation. It is one
of the "other eightn, and so ontologically falls under quality. Thus i t
is something that is, in a sense, real, and so describing it will
facilitate our comparison with contemporary Tropist thought.
In Ordinatio I, dist. 30, Ockham explains how relation is
subordinate to substance and qualities in the form of a response to
those of his contemporaries holding a three term view of relation.
The three term view implies that, for relation xRy, there are three
really distinct things involved: x, y, and relation R. Ockham argues
that, since every thing distinct from other things in reality is
understandable without the other things being understood, a three
term view is impossible. For if relation R were a really distinct
thing from x andy, R would be understandable without cbnsidering
x and y. "But it is impossible for something which is a relation to
be understood without any other thing."l7
Take the relation of similarity that is said of Socrates and Plato
with respect to their whiteness. One could not speak of this
similarity without an understanding of Plato's whiteness and
Socrates' whiteness. How then can we understand the proposition,
"Socrates is similar to Plato with respect to whiteness"? It sounds
as if the relation of similarity is being predicated of Socrates as an
ontologically real category, as something really distinct from
Socrates that Socrates has. But this is not the way things are. If this
proposition is t o be true, Socrates must have the pamcular quality
whiteness, and Plato must also have particular whiteness, If the
conjunct quality predication obtains, Socrates is similarity-related to
Plato automatically, by virtue of the fact that both are white.
"Whence he who could understand Socrates and Plato and their
whitenesses, with nothing else understood, would say at once that
Socrates is similar to Plato."l* We can see from this that the
' ' ~ r d i n ~I,o dkt 30, q. 1, in Arthur Hyman &James Ialakh, Pbibmpby in L
287.17
Middk Aga, 2d ed. (Indianapolis, Ih': Hadrett Press, 1986) 680. Otb
"...sed impoaibile est aliquam run, quac sit rclatio, intelligi s h e omni alia re
310.6-8 "Unde qui poset intelligerc Sortem et Platonem et
181bid, 682; OTb
albedines corum, nihil aliud intelligendo, statim diceret Sonem w e similem
Platoni."

...."
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relation is not something ontologically added to Socrates being
white and Plato being white, yet it makes sense to say that this
relation is real, in the sense that it is not something constituted by
the human understanding.
But it should be imagined that the intellect contributes no
more to the fact that Socrates is similar than the fact that Socrates
is white. Indeed, from this itself, that Socrates is white, and that
Plato is white, Socrates is similar to Plato with everydung else
imaginable aside. [And thus Socrates is similar to Plato solely by
absolutes, with all else either in things or in the intellect aside.]
And so, nothing exists in reality outside of absolutes.19
For Ockham's purposes, a relation is not something real in the
same sense that a particular substance or a particular quality is real,
because the relation is not really distinct from a certain state of
affairs obtaining with regards to a given substance and quality. That
is, relations are not three term affairs. But for Armstrong's Trope
Nominalist purposes, Ockham's relations are real enough, in that i t
is not something constituted by the mind, as would be the case for a
Concept Nominalist. I hope to have shown in this example that
OdEham's conception of relation is not unlike that of the Tropist,
and also how the "other eight categoriesn are able to be
incorporated under the ontologically real category of quality.
Next we should address the relation of inherence. Is this
relation a quality of a quality in the same way that it was
characterized as a higher-order Trope? Armstrong suggests that
Tropes might have higher-order Tropes on the substance-attribute
model, with states of affairs frustrating regress, but this option does
not appear to be open to Ockharn. Relations are real enough in the
Tropist sense, but recall that for Ockham they have their basis in
kinds of names of things, not in things, so perhaps the problem of
whether particular qualities in themselves have relations, like the
particular quality of white having the particular inhering-in relation
--

'%id, 6&);OTb IY, 316.10-16 'Sed sic a t imagiaandum quod intellectus nihil
plus fiat ad hocquod S o w sit sirnilis quam ad hoc quod Sortes sit albus. Immo ex
hoc ipso quod S o w st albus er Plato st a l h , Sorter at similis Platoni, omni Jio
imaginabii arcurnscripto. [Et ita Soncs a t similis Platoni proper sola absoluta,
omni Jio vclinrc vel in intelleftu drcumscripto.] Et ia in re nihil en pneter
absolm." (Bracketed sentence not included in Walsh translation.)
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to Socrates, becomes a question of how names, or terms, are
ordered.20
But this will not do as an adequate explanation; the accidents of
the bread exist in exactly the same place as the body of Christ
without inhering in it as accidents in substance. And if God can do
that, surely God could bring it about that the accidents of any
substance, while remaining substantial, first do, then do not inhere
in that substance? Inherence seems to be something clearly distinct
from particular qualities on doctrinal grounds. Have we a relation
here not based on the names of things, but rather on things?
Marilyn Adams suggests that Ockham can make an exception of
inherence in this case, since "... inherence-the relation between
any putative accident-thing and its substance-is not included under
any of the species of relation or other accidents recognized by
I would suggest declaring the relation
Aristotle in the Categ~ries."~'
of inherence's real distinguishability to be a primitive, without
which the ontology just would not make sense, and leaving it at that.
We ought to note here what we are talking about when we
mention a particular substance. What makes this substance a
particular substance is not some metaphysical constituent of the
particular substance; Ockham, if an essentialist at all, is much less of
one than his moderate realist contemporaries. "...Dl n creatures
there can never be any distinction outside the mind unless there are
distinct things; if, therefore, there is any distinction between the
nature and the difference, it is necessary that they really be distinct
things."" The particular substance is particular because this form
and this matter are taken as combined. Are matter and form
particular qualities of substance? It would seem not; not in the way
that this white or this roundness are particular qualities inhering in
this particular substance. It is out of this matter and this form that
these particular qualities arise.
The only thing in Socrates which can be constructed as
substantial is this particular matter, this particular form, or the
Z O ~Summa
ee
Logicat I, Chpt.44.
Z'~arilyn
McCord Mams, Wdimn Ockbmn, 276.
zzSrmmroLogicuc I, rap. 16, Lour, 83. OPTb 1, 54.1 1-14 "...in aeattnis nunqaim
potest esse aliqua disdnctio qullixnunque extra animam nisi ubi res distinctae sum; si
i g i inter
~ istam naturam et istam differentiam sit qua&amque distinctio, opomt
quod sint res realiter distinctae."
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composite of the two. And therefore every essence and quiddity and
whatever belongs to substance, if it is really outside the soul, is just
matter, form, or the composite of the
The point of this is to show that it seems difficult to think of
substance as exactly the same sort of base for inherent qualities as
Armstrong's "thin particular"; this complexity of how and in what
particular qualities inhere further shows the utility of espousing the
primitivity of the inherence relation.
Now that we have assembled the necessary ingredients, can we
claim states of affiirs for Ockham? I believe that here our argument
for a Tropist position is strongest. It would seem a potentially
dangerous area, since here Ockham's conceptualism is a critical
factor, and we have been warned about the shaky a priori nature of
an appeal to an artificed structure in laying out an ontology. But as
we will see, Ockham's conceptualism is quite amenable to reliable
states of affairs characterization.
In the Tropist position, simply having the ingredients for Fx
was not enough; what was needed was that Fx obtain as a state of
affairs. How does Ockham characterize how Fx can obtain as a state
of affairs? He is not bound, as are the Empiricists, to sense-data
theorizing epistemologically; Ockham believes that an intuitive
cognition of something in the world affords direct access to the way
things are. "...I say that the intellect at first knows the singular
intuitively. This is because the intellect knows intuitively what
exists in reality, but nothing is such unless it is singular."24
Once this intuition is made, say an intuition of a white object,
the intellect is able immediately to abstract from the intuitive
cognition and form a "complexn along the lines of, "this body is
white", and judge the truth of the complex. But, "...neither t h e
formation of the complex nor the act of assenting to the complex is

Z31bid,84,OPTb 1, 57.79-83 "...sed quiquid imaginible substantiale usistens in
Sone vel est materia particularis vel forma particularis ve1 compositum ex his. Et
idm om&. essentia et quidditas et quidquid est substantiae, si sit realiter extra
animam, vel est simplicter et absolute materia vel forma vel composinun a his..."
2 4 ~ 1 1q. 13,
, Hyman and Walsh, 677 [incorrectly listed as q. IS] OTb Y.
284.1-4 '...dice quod intellectus primo intelligit singdare intuitive. Turn quia
inteliecms intelligit illud qnod est in re intuitive; sed nihii est tale nisi singdue."
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intuitive c o g n i t i ~ n . "These
~ ~ are abstractive cognitions, where the
propositions or complexes that comprise the concepts are
constructed and judged, and they require intuitive cognitions for
their formation. Ockham explains that it is possible to make evident
judgements at this elementary level. "A non-complex knowledge of
purely intelligible terms is sufficient for evident knowledge of a
contingent truth.*26 But complex propositional knowledge is
required to get at the truth of things.
What does this amount to? The key to the matter lies in his
reference to a "singular." Ockham explains that a singular is
"...taken for a thing that is numerically one, and that is not a natural
or voluntary or conventional sign that is common to many."n This
seems an effective definition for a fact, a state of affairs in the
world. Let us now posit a simple state of affairs, Fx. The intellect
intuitively cognizes Fx by recognizing (F, x, inherence). At this
stage, a contingent truth can be known: it could be the case that,
given (F, x, inherence), Fx obtains. When the intellect forms for
itself, through a natural sign or concept, the proposition "Fx", i t
can judge for itself by abstractive cognition that "Fx" is true, and
thus that the singular, Fx, a state of affairs in the world, obtains.
Could God arrange for intuitive cognition of a singular that does
not, in fact, obtain? This would allow for the intuitive cognition of
non-existents, which might threaten our state of affairs model.
Ockham recognizes that this is certainly a possibility.
If it (the intuitive cognition) is naturally caused, then it cannot
be unless the object exists and is present in the required
proximity.... But if it is supernatural, for instance, if God should
cause in me the intuitive cognition of some object existing at
Rome, immediately upon the cognition of it I can judge that that

2 S ~ p . c iOrb
t V, 293.2-4 'Unde sicut non omnis notitia incomlua est generative
habitus incomplexi, i n nec om& notitia complexa at gcnentiva habitus complexi."
260rdinotia,prologus, q. I, in William Ockham, Pbilasopbical Writing, Philotheus
Boehner, O.F.M. ed. and transl., revised by Stephen Brown (Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett Press, 1990) 21. 07%J29.3-5. "...sola notitia incomplua terminom mere
intelligibilium sufficit ad notitiam evidentem talis veritatis contingentis."
2 7 ~ d l i b eI,
t q. 13 in WilIimn of Orkbam, Quodlibd Questions, Freddoso and
Kelley, 64. 02%lX,72.15-17 *... sed accipitur pro re quac est una numm a non est
signum n a ~ l vel
e volunnrium sivt ad pladtum commune multis...."
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which I intuit and see exists, just as well as if that cognition were
had naturally.28
This does not threaten the model at all, for God will not deceive
us through this supernatural cognition, but will only give us a
greater-than-natural access to states of affairs.
But speaking of access to states of affairs, what is the ontological
status of a concept? If it has a different sort of being than things in
the world, might not the reliability of the direct access to states of
affairs be questionable? Ockham initially gave concepts "objective
existence", making them nothing more than thought-objects in the
mind, "a kind of mental picture which as a thought-object has a
being similar to that which the thing outside the mind has in its
real exi~tence."~~
But Ockham saw that this objective being was
really nothing, and so not a reliable way of describing how it is we
come to recognize states of affairs. He then concluded that a
concept is a mental act, the same as the act of knowing, which more
easily allowed him to say that the concept is a reliable
representation of how things are in the world, since it has the same
sort of being as any other act of a substance.M Ockham explained
that these were states of minds capable of naturally signifying that
for which they stand. While Annstrong does not tackle
epistemological problems at this level in his explanation of Trope
Nominalism, we would presume that he believes that we can have as
certain a knowledge of states of affairs as Ockham believes that we
can.
We have already said that these concepts representing things in
the world do so in the form of propositions; have we thereby
committed the argument from linguistic structure against which
2
8 If, q. I3
~ Hymn and Walsb, 672. OT/J V; 258.11-23 'Nam si
naolnliter auuw, tunc non pocest eae nisi obiectum usistat pnesens in debita
approximadone; ..% antan sit supematunlis, pum si Deus causaret in me
cognitionem inmitivam de aliquo obimo usistern Romae, statim habita
OCet
I video est, ita
cognidione emJ inruitiva possmn iudiure qood ill& ~IIintueor
h e simt si fi cognitio haberenu natnraliter."
ZPOdiuazh1, dtt 2, q. 8, in W
Ockhun, Pbilomppbirnl W-gr,
Boehner,
4 1 , m I. 271-14-2722 '...univade non est aliqoid reale habenr esse subiectivum,
nac in mima ncc
7&mm,
sed tanmm habet ews obiectivum in mima, et est
q n o d k fictnm h b m s ase tale in ase obiectivo, qualc habet rn extra in esse
mbiam."
'Osct ErparitlBin libnmr P h i n r A r i c m t d k L i b . I. cap. 6, in OPIbII. 351-356.
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Armstrong warned? Are we led to posit an ontology on the basis of
how concepts form in our minds? Ockham recognizes that this
charge can be made, and responds with a distinction between
written and spoken words on the one hand and mental words on the
other. Spoken and written words signify through convention,
through artificed language. "Homo," "Man," and "Hornrnen refer
to the same creature because they are words invented to do so. But
mental words, or conceptual terms, do not. "The conceptual term is
an intention or impression of the soul which signifies or cosignifies
something naturally and is capable of being a part of a mental
proposition and of suppositing in such a proposition for the thing
signified."3'
The mind's own intellectual acts are called states of mind.
By their nature they stand for the actual things outside the mind,
just as the spoken words stand for them by convention.^
If this is the case, Ockham will escape the subjectivity of the
Concept Nominalist position, because concepts naturally represent
states of affairs. The trouble with this is that it is hard to prove. In
fact, it is the nature of this problem that caused Wittgenstein to
turn away from his stated project in the Tractatus; not only is
Ockham relying on our understanding of the world based on a
mental language, but he is also claiming that this mental language
develops to become the same "languagen in all of us, and that i t
naturally signifies how things are in the world. Ockham's response
to this horrified question of "how can this possibly be proven?"
might well be a simple, "how can it be disproven?" After all, every
other link in this chain seems sound. Although we have not
examined Ockham's term logic and his explanation of the types of
signification mental terms exhibit, most will agree that his account
of this was thorough, and his ontology certainly seems tenable
enough, insofar as it meets Armstrong's Tropist demands. If we
recognize that, while natural signification seems impossible to
31~rtnma
Logicac I, cap. 1, Lour, 49. OPTb I, 7.19-21 "Terminus conceptus at
intentio seu passio animae &quid naturaliter significans vel consignificans, m u esse
pars propositionis mentalis, et pro eodun nag supponere."
3 2 ~ a s i t i 0in Libntm Peribmnmiar Arirtotclir Lib. I, cap. 6 in W
h of Oekhun
Pbilosvpbiral W d g s , Boehner, 44. OPTb I, 351 "Breviter iginu, ipsae inteltections
animae VOCanN passiones animae, et supponunt u natura an pro ipsis rebus extra
vel pro aliis rebus in anima, sicnt voca supponunt pro rebus ex institutione...."
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prove, it's corresponding impossibility to be disproven allows us a
safe bridge between states of affairs in the world and our
understanding of them. Further, it is no more unpalatable then
Armstrong's assumption that we can reliably know enough about
states of affairs.
These are not persuasive enough arguments for philosophers
accustomed to the rigors of analytic thought, but I think that if
more convincing arguments are attempted in favor of natural
signification, Ockham's ontology would be hard to dismiss in the
contemporary discussion. I hope to have shown how Ockham's
ontological position is largely in accord with Trope Nominalism as
described by D. M. Armstrong. Armstrong does not address the
problem of how mental terms signify; natural signification might be
necessary in the Trope Nominalist position as well, if his
confidence in the reliability of human thought and language, and
hence of human science, to represent states of affairs in the world
is as strong as I believe it to be.
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